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116 Abstract
In 2011, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, Poland increased its value added 
tax rates. Despite an already large VAT policy gap, further rate differentiation 
was used to address distributional concerns and to protect the most vulnerable 
households. We find that the changes to the VAT rate structure hardly improved the 
overall progressivity of the VAT and the tax system as a whole. While providing 
only minimal relief to the poor, taxation of food products at a super reduced rate 
greatly subsidized the richer households. With a small change to the income tax 
structure, the government could have secured more progressivity at a lower cost 
in terms of revenue foregone. 
Keywords: value added tax, household consumption, income distribution, tax pro-
gressivity, VAT reduced rates, Polish tax reform experience 
1 INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of pursuing vertical equity objectives through value added tax 
(VAT) has been long questioned in economic literature (Cnossen, 1982; Tait, 1988; 
Ebrill et al., 2001; OECD, 2010). Yet policymakers invariably exhibit a particular 
liking for VAT rate differentiation. Even if desperate to raise revenue, they seem 
to prefer to increase the general VAT rate rather than to eliminate reduced rates 
and exemptions. This is the experience of the EU countries that undertook fiscal 
consolidation in response to the recent financial crisis (IMF, 2013). Most of them 
favored outright VAT rate increases over the much advocated base broadening and 
closing the gap between standard and reduced rates (Garnier et al., 2013). 
The Polish experience has not been different. While seeking additional revenue 
the government opted for a universal VAT increase rather than abolition of re­
duced rates. In 2011 both the standard and the reduced rates were raised by one 
percentage point. At the same time, the rate on most food products was further 
lowered thus widening the VAT rate gap. Such rate adjustment was driven by the 
government desire to protect the most vulnerable and improve the overall progres­
sivity of the tax regime (PRM, 2010). But the question is raised as to whether 
pursuing these objectives through VAT is the right policy choice. Can we afford to 
help the poor by subsidizing the rich?
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the distributional impact of the 2011 
changes to VAT rate structure in Poland and assess whether the reform was suc­
cessful in achieving distributional objectives or perhaps there might have been 
better alternatives to mitigate the impact of general VAT increases. We use data 
from the household budget survey and estimate the impact of VAT for households 
across the income distribution for the actual reform and an alternative scenario 
where the VAT rate on food is not reduced. In our analysis we measure VAT inci­
dence in two ways: (1) relative to consumption which we take as a proxy for life­
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7income in order to arrive at a comparable benchmark for VAT and income tax 
burden. 
There is no shortage of Polish literature analyzing the redistributive effects of in­
direct taxes (see for example: Nagel and Neneman, 1995; Radziukiewicz, 2011; 
Dobrowolska and Starzynska, 2011). Amongst foreign academics, perhaps the 
first insights into the Polish VAT rate structure and its implications were provided 
by Cnossen (1998). Only recently, with Poland’s accession to the EU has the cov­
erage of the equity aspects of VAT in Poland improved. Many academics (e.g. 
Borselli et al., 2012) and various European institutions (e.g. European Commis­
sion, 2011) embarked on analyzing the structure, performance and redistributive 
impact of the Polish VAT, mostly as part of broader and comparative studies. To 
the best of our knowledge, however, the incidence of the recent adjustments of the 
VAT rates in Poland has not been subject to a rigorous analysis. This paper is 
aimed to partially fill this gap.  
The remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. First, we briefly review 
theoretical aspects of VAT distributional impact, focusing on the rationale and ef­
fects of rate differentiation as well as measurement of VAT incidence. Then, we 
describe the Polish VAT structure and performance and explain in greater detail 
the VAT reform analyzed. Finally, we evaluate changes in VAT redistribution as a 
result of the reform. 
2 VAT AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY 
2.1 OBJECTIVES OF VAT RATE DIFFERENTIATION 
Value added tax is one of the most popular taxes. In one or another form it has now 
been implemented worldwide by an overwhelming majority of countries. The ac­
tual causes and consequences of the spread of VAT have been little investigated 
empirically (Keen and Lockwood, 2010). Yet countries find it a good replacement 
to their often obscure and less efficient production, trade or retail sales taxes. Once 
introduced, VAT becomes an inherent part of tax systems. 
VAT owes its remarkable popularity to its design. Many features are undeniably 
appealing. By taxing domestic consumption VAT raises significant amounts of 
revenue in an efficient and stable manner. On average it raises revenue amounting 
to seven percent of GDP in high income countries and five percent of GDP in low­
income countries with an upward trend (Keen, 2013b). It serves as an effective 
replacement for trade taxes being now successively curtailed due to regional inte­
gration and ongoing trade liberalization. Most importantly, however, VAT raises 
revenue without hampering investment and savings. It is also fairly simple in 
 There are only a few instances where it was abolished, e.g. Malta, Vietnam, Grenada; and this happened 
mostly due to poor planning and implementation, rather than VAT design per se (Grandcolas, 2005). Most of 
these countries have now reintroduced a form of VAT.
 Although VAT revenue exhibits a pattern of pro­cyclicality (see Ebeke and Vazquez, 2014) its fluctuation is 
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118 terms of compliance. If well designed it has most of the attributes of a “good” tax 
(IMF, 2011; Bird and Gendron, 2007). 
Although there are plenty of reasons to praise VAT, its distributional impact raises 
a lot of concerns amongst policymakers.3 Over the years, VAT has gained a reputa­
tion as a regressive tax and this perception seems nowhere close to fading away. It 
does persist, at least at policymaker’s level, and results in various attempts to 
make VAT a more progressive tax (e.g., Matheson and Swistak, 2014). Rate dif­
ferentiations and exemptions are used for this purpose. On the surface the policy 
argument seems to be straightforward – with lower VAT rates on basic products, 
e.g. food, the poorer households may consume more and their total VAT payments 
represent a smaller share of their incomes than would be the case if all goods were 
subject to the standard rate. Yet the richer households also benefit from reduced 
rates, in absolute terms even more – all at the cost of foregone revenue, efficiency 
loss and increased complexity (Tait, 1988; IMF, 2011; Matheson and Swistak, 
2014). 
There are only a handful of countries where VAT concessions are hardly used at 
all, New Zealand and Australia being commonly cited as flagship examples. These 
are countries with relatively new VATs and they managed to rely on economic and 
administrative logic rather than cultivating historical and compromised solutions 
(Cnossen, 2003). This is the experience of most EU member states, where VAT 
concessions continue to be widespread. Apart from a few notable exceptions, in­
cluding Bulgaria and Denmark, most European countries rely on them heavily. 
The list of items commonly subject to reduced rates, including a zero­rate, is 
lengthy and encompasses food products, medicines, housing, books and newspa­
pers, and many others, not excluding clothing, energy products, and even alco­
holic beverages. 
Addressing distributional concerns is not the exclusive reason for the adoption of 
reduced VAT rates. They are also used, rightly or wrongly, to change the relative 
prices of goods and services and steer consumption in a direction conforming to 
other policy objectives. For example, lower taxation of labor intensive services in 
the EU, e.g. hairdressers, window cleaning or repair services, was meant to in­
crease demand for these services, mostly self­supplied at home rather than pro­
cured in the market, and thus boost employment (Copenhagen Economics, 2007). 
Norway used VAT rate differentiation to promote healthier diets (Gustavsen and 
Rickertsen, 2013). Many countries tax merit goods and services, e.g. medicines, 
textbooks, sport and cultural services, at a lower level (or exempt them) to encour­
age their consumption, as being in public interest and benefiting the whole society. 
Similarly, rate differentiation is used to correct externalities by way of applying 
reduced rates to energy­saving appliances (OECD, 2010). The justification for 
3 The other Achilles heel of VAT is the need for refunds of excess credits. In many countries, especially devel­





























































39 (2) 115-137 (2015)
119VAT reduced rates is also offered on administrative grounds. Some countries, e.g. 
France, the Netherlands, and Poland, tax construction services related to renova­
tion and maintenance of private dwellings at a reduced rate, and others, e.g. Ice­
land, effectively zero­rate them through reimbursement of VAT paid on such serv­
ices, with a view, at least partially, to counteracting tax evasion in the construction 
sector. In 2013 Romania reduced its VAT rate on bakery products on the very same 
grounds – to tackle tax evasion.4
2.2 VAT INCIDENCE 
The focal point of the discussion of the vertical equity of VAT is the question of 
who bears the burden. Fairness requires taxes to take into account the taxpayers’ 
ability to pay, hence implying that the share of income taken in taxes increases as 
income rises (progressivity). Even though such a statement may be difficult to 
defend on efficiency grounds this is a strong political expectation: taxes should be 
progressive or at least not regressive. Measuring progressivity of VAT is challeng­
ing. The notion of income redistribution would imply that VAT incidence should 
be tested against income. Yet the VAT base is consumption and not income. Should 
the VAT incidence be assessed against consumption, as the nature of the tax im­
plies, or income, as the incidence theory suggests? Below we briefly review con­
ceptual arguments for using both metrics.5
In theory a uniform and comprehensive VAT imposes a flat burden on all con­
sumption expenditure (Tait, 1988). In this sense, VAT is proportional – all taxpay­
ers give up an equal share of their consumption to pay the tax. This is true regard­
less of their personal characteristics, consumption preferences or even source of 
income used to finance their spending. Whether they are rich or poor, single or 
with dependents, healthy or disabled all taxpayers forego a fixed percentage of 
their private spending to meet the VAT liability. The same holds true whether they 
buy staple food or lavish meals in expensive restaurants, rely on private cars or 
use public transport, rent or buy a house. Under a broad­based and uniform VAT, 
all taxpayers – as long as they spend – are equally burdened with VAT. Neverthe­
less, in practice achieving proportional distribution is hardly possible, for even 
under a well­designed VAT a portion of spending escapes taxation.6 
The actual distribution of VAT payments is, nevertheless, very sensitive to the rate 
structure and exemptions built into the VAT and to the patterns of consumer pref­
erences (Ebrill et al., 2001). Relative to consumption the use of preferences may 
make VAT a progressive tax. In such a setting the share of VAT payment rises with 
4 The Romanian authorities are currently looking to apply the same reduction to meat products to counter­
act fictitious imports and tax evasion in the meat industry (see news by Simona Bazavan on: http://business­
review.eu/featured/romanian­authorities­consider­cutting­the­vat­for­meat­products­to­9­pct/).
5 The third possibility – at least in theory – would be to test VAT incidence against wealth. This discussion, 
however, goes beyond the scope of the paper.
6 This happens for administrative reasons, e.g. exemption of small traders as a result of the VAT threshold. Such 
a design benefits mostly low income households as they are more likely to buy from non­taxed small businesses. 
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0 the level of consumption as better off households spend more on fully taxed goods 
and services than those less affluent, where their spending on lightly taxed or zero­
rated basic products, e.g. food, constitutes a large proportion of their consump­
tion. 
An intuitive approach to the measurement of the distributional impact of any tax, 
including a VAT, would be to use income as denominator. Early empirical studies, 
including those by Musgrave et al. (1974) or Pechman (1985), favored the annual 
incidence approach, similar to that used for income tax evaluation. Such an ap­
proach renders VAT a regressive tax. This is inevitable. As poorer households save 
little and consume higher shares of their current income, VAT accounts for a larger 
proportion of their earnings than the VAT paid by the rich. 
Some argue, however, that measurement of VAT incidence against annual income 
is misleading (Gaspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Metcalf, 1997; Creedy, 1998). This 
is because, in line with permanent income hypothesis and life­cycle considera­
tions (Friedman, 1957), income levels tend to vary over time, with young and old 
households earning low incomes and middle aged households disproportionally 
higher, i.e. high enough to pay back past borrowing and save for future consump­
tion. In anticipation of future changes in income levels households prefer to 
smooth their consumption so it is higher than income in the early years of a life­
time cycle, lower in the middle and again higher at the end. 
In theory, given the above considerations, one could argue that all income is con­
sumed over the lifetime. From this perspective any consumption tax, including 
VAT, is a proportional tax (Gaspersen and Metcalf, 1994; Athreya and Reilly, 
2009). When rate differentiation is used the incidence of VAT shifts towards richer 
consumers as they tend to consume more goods and services taxed at a standard 
rate. Using the lifetime incidence Decoster et al. (2010) find that actual VATs in a 
number of European countries are slightly progressive. The same approach has 
been used in a number of individual VAT studies. For example, Arsic and Altipar­
makov (2013) show that Serbian VAT is proportional. The same results may be 
found in Slintakova and Klazar (2010) for the Czech Republic, and in Braz and 
Correia da Cunha (2009) for Portugal. 
Proponents of the lifetime approach argue that measuring VAT incidence at any 
given point in the life­cycle renders blurred results. In a lifetime sense, neither 
young nor old households are poor nor are high­earners rich at their peak. Since 
consumption fluctuates less from year to year than income it is a better measure of 
household well­being than total annual income and constitutes a good proxy for 
its lifetime income (Poterba, 1989). This reinforces the logic, mentioned above, 
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Unfortunately, lifetime income or consumption incidence does not seem to be ap­
pealing to policymakers. Indeed, not all households use up all their lifetime in­
come and much of it is passed on to the next generations in bequests. In welfare 
states, not all households rely exclusively on their own income and later on their 
savings – a system of benefits and state funded pensions plays a significant role. 
Also, households’ sizes and compositions change over time and it is hardly pos­
sible to have a household that follows the lifecycle of an earning individual.
Finally and most importantly, the political economy argument has to be taken into 
account. The lifetime approach has a long horizon which is not attractive to poli­
cymakers and taxpayers. It hinges on the assumption that the incomes of younger 
households grow and exceed their needs in middle age allowing for savings to be 
used towards the end of the life cycle. This is too optimistic to convince currently 
poor individuals, with low skills, productivity and thus little potential for increased 
future earnings. It is not difficult to argue that the poor need help when they face 
life hurdles. And the governments provide it – either through transfers from the 
budget or taxation. Interestingly, in defining the beneficiaries of social programs, 
e.g. family allowances, housing benefits, etc., countries tend to rely on an annual 
income test. Income taxes are also annual – the tax scale is applicable to annual 
income and most of the allowances and credits apply annual ceilings. Examples 
where carry­forward or carry­back are used to smooth personal income over years 
are scarce. Given the above it is more reasonable to measure the incidence of 
consumption taxes against annual income.
2.3 VAT AND INCOME TAX
Value added tax, as an in rem and not personal consumption tax, is ill suited to 
pursue progressivity. Fortunately, VAT is not the only element of the tax system 
and its distributional impact should not be analyzed in isolation. If one is con­
cerned about fairness of taxation as a whole then an assessment of the overall im­
pact of taxes on income distribution should be made. An income tax, whose inci­
dence is usually measured on annual basis, is an obvious candidate. The inherent 
regressivity of a broad­based and single­rated VAT may be mitigated by progres­
sive personal income taxes. We show this correlation in a stylized way in figure 1.
All things being equal both taxpayers and governments are indifferent to the form 
in which taxes are raised. What is important is the change in disposable income as 
a consequence of overall taxation. As income level rises, a smaller proportion of 
income is taken in VAT but this is counterbalanced by higher shares of personal 
income tax, making the tax system progressive. As argued in Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976) and Cnossen (1982) as long as a country can flexibly choose the rate struc­
ture under the personal income tax, then it has no reason to choose differential tax 
rates on the consumption of different goods and services.7 Such argumentation 
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 implies that income tax is an effective instrument of redistribution, which may not 
necessarily be true (Bird, 1987), as many poor individuals do not pay income 
taxes and the rich derive their wealth from non­wage income and usually escape 
progressive taxation.8 Yet, the same may be true for VAT. The poor, with no or 
little income, either do not participate in monetized economy or buy from infor­
mal or small businesses and thus pay little or no VAT. In turn, the rich may avoid 
part of the VAT burden by claiming their private consumption as business inputs 
(e.g. cars, accommodation, computer equipment and software, etc.) or exploit 
cross­country rate differentiations and partly consume in lower­taxed jurisdictions 
(e.g. tourism, wellness and beauty, high tech devices, etc.). After all, in the case of 
the extremely rich, both income and consumption taxes fail to take a fair share of 
their annual incomes. 
Figure 1 
Stylized correlation of PIT and VAT incidence
Source: Authors.
Although we give due credit to the imperfections of income taxes in addressing 
distributional concerns, we argue that it is a better way of attaining progressivity 
in the tax system than using rate differentiation under VAT. Our argument for a 
uniform VAT rate structure is the poor targeting and the concomitant unnecessary 
revenue loss due to rate differentiation; in addition, there are the complexities and 
costliness of VAT compliance and administration involved with differentiated 
rates. If a specific good is taxed at a lower rate, say, fruit and vegetables, bakery 
products or children’s clothing, such a good becomes more affordable to the poor 
and they pay less in VAT. But the more affluent households also benefit from this 
measure, even more in absolute terms. This translates into significant revenue loss 
and/or higher taxes elsewhere to make up for the revenue loss. In order to alleviate 
the plight of the poor, governments agree to give even higher tax relief to rich 
8 For example, in Poland, business and capital income are taxed at a flat rate of 19 percent, whereas labor 
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123taxpayers, an odd and costly manner of injecting progressivity into the tax system. 
Adoption of reduced rates could yield equitable results only if applied to goods 
and services whose absolute consumption falls as income rises. Given the conver­
gence of consumption patterns across all income levels, there are not many obvi­
ous candidates. Staple food, like rice, potatoes or flour may potentially conform to 
such a pattern.
Also, efforts required for a proper delineation between standard and lower taxed 
goods (e.g. children’s and adult clothing) drive up compliance and administration 
costs. Equity gains, once again, are likely to be outweighed by the increased ad­
ministration costs resulting from cost of interpretation, classification rules, issu­
ance of advanced rulings, complex filing, audits, disputes, etc.9 
3 REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF VAT RATE DIFFERENTIATION IN POLAND
3.1 VAT STRUCTURE AND REFORM OVERVIEW
After reviewing theoretical considerations on the redistributive effects of VAT we 
turn now to an incidence analysis of Polish VAT. Our focus will be on the distri­
butional impact of the 2011 adjustments to the VAT rate structure. We begin with 
a brief overview of VAT structure and performance, present details of the VAT 
reform and follow with our findings.
Value added tax is the main source of government revenues for Poland, account­
ing for almost 44 percent of total tax collection. In 2011 it raised PLN 120.8 bil­
lion (USD 40.8 billion0) which totaled to 8.1 percent of GDP, around the average 
for EU member states. The revenue performance, measured as a ratio of actual and 
theoretical VAT collections, at only 45 percent in 2011, was one of the lowest in 
the EU though (EU, 2013). One of the reasons for the relatively wide VAT gap is 
the rate structure. Borselli et al. (2012) estimates that more than 40 percent of 
final consumption is subject to reduced rates, bringing down the effective VAT to 
less than 15 percent, only two­thirds of the standard rate of 23 percent.  
Data from annual tax expenditure budgets prepared by the Polish Ministry of Fi­
nance confirms the generosity of VAT (MF, 2013). In 2011 they amounted to PLN 
41.1 billion (or USD 13.9 billion), i.e. 2.7 percent of GDP and 34 percent of ac­
9 In 2013 alone, the Polish tax administration issued over 2,000 advanced rulings regarding the application of 
the VAT rate. Inquiries for interpretation or clarification included the application of a proper VAT rate to take­
away meals, furniture assembling, certain construction services performed in dwellings, drinks with addi­
tion of coffee, latex gloves, magazine and CD/DVD bundles, etc. (Data received from Ministry of Finance, 
Poland.)
0 All PLN values cited in this paper were converted into USD at PLN/USD exchange rate at 2.96 (average 
for 2011). 
 Assumes total final consumption taxed at standard VAT rate and perfect tax compliance (no evasion). 
 The other important reasons are exemptions and tax compliance. The recent European Commission study on 
VAT compliance gap found that in 2011 Poland lost 15 percent of their VAT (theoretical tax liability of VAT 
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124 tual VAT collections.13 The highest contributors to the overall value of tax expen­
ditures in the VAT were residential construction services, food products and med­
icines. Among the food products the most costly were meat, dairy and bakery, 
totaling respectively to PLN 2.9 billion (USD 1 billion), PLN 1.7 billion (USD 0.6 
billion) and PLN 1.1 billion (USD 0.4 billion).  
Unlike revenue performance, the stability of rates has long been a signature fea­
ture of the Polish VAT, putting it at the forefront of the EU member states (see EC, 
2014). On its adoption in mid­1993 VAT in Poland was imposed at the standard 
rate of 22 percent. A number of goods and services, including certain food prod­
ucts, clothing and accessories for children, energy products for household con­
sumption, telecommunication services and construction materials were taxed at a 
lower seven percent rate. In 2000, a second reduced rate of three percent was 
adopted to encompass previously exempted basic food products. Upon accession 
to the EU the list of goods and services subject to reduced rates as well as to ex­
emptions was further revised. In spite of such reshuffling the main rates, however, 
remained unchanged. 
Not until 2011, faced with the need to constrain public debt, did Poland decide to 
increase VAT rates. The adjustments of VAT rates were twofold. The standard and 
reduced rates rose by one percentage point – from 22 to 23 percent and from 
seven to eight percent respectively. The VAT increases coincided with the expiry 
of the pre­accession derogatory regime. The concessional zero­rate on books and 
periodicals (not newspapers) and the three percent rate on certain unprocessed 
food items, as being below the EU minimum of five percent required by the VAT 
Directive, were doomed for increases. The government, rather than use the re­
duced rate already in place decided to introduce a new one – a super reduced rate 
of five percent. Most of the food products, previously subject to the higher re­
duced rate (now at eight percent) were moved to the new lower five percent rate. 
Interestingly, the government, even though faced with the need to collect more tax 
revenues, did not decide to rely on only one reduced rate, let alone abolishing re­
duced rates altogether. Adoption of the super reduced rate of five percent, compro­
mising VAT revenue productivity, contradicted the objective of general VAT in­
creases. Such a policy choice was geared to address equity concerns and improve 
progressivity of VAT. As stated in the justification to the bill introducing new 
rates, it was the Government’s desire to alleviate the impact of VAT increases on 
the poorer households via lower taxation of food which “constitutes significant 
part of spending by the less affluent part of the society” (PRM, 2010). The Gov­
ernment chose to achieve this explicitly by way of rate differentiation, a three 
13 The actual cost of revenue foregone may be in fact higher since – in line with the adopted benchmark – only 
such VAT concession were considered to be a tax expenditure that deviates from the standard VAT design as 
provided in the EU VAT Directive. Hence, for example most of exemptions granted to services provided in 
public interest (e.g. public bodies, postal, broadcasting or social services) and financial, including insurance, 
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125percentage points lower taxation of food. No corresponding measures on the reve­
nue side were proposed and adopted. 
Such a policy was not conceptually different from the approach taken in the past 
when reduced rates on Internet services and construction materials were abol­
ished. In every single case it was an explicit government desire to correct the 
distributional impact of VAT rate changes and the only differences was in the 
choice of measures for achieving that. Table 1 summarizes the VAT changes and 
the corresponding compensating measures.
Table 1 
Summary of VAT rate changes and compensating measures in Poland
Year VAT rate change Compensating measure
2004
Repealing of reduced rate  
on Internet access services
Income tax allowance of PLN 760  
(USD 257) per year
2008
Repealing of reduced rate  
on construction materials
Cash rebate equal to 12.3 percent of 
spending on construction materials 
previously taxed at a reduced rate
0
Standard and reduced rate increased 
by one percentage point (from 22  
and 7 to 23 and 8 percent, respectively)
VAT rate on food products lowered  
by three percentage points (from eight 
to five percent)
Source: Polish legislation (available at: www.orka.sejm.gov.pl). 
In the next two sections, we analyze the 2011 adjustments to the VAT rate struc­
ture. For simplicity we call these adjustments a “reform” though such a policy 
measure falls short of a genuine tax reform. Like the other changes to VAT rates 
listed in table 1, it appears to be merely a one­off adjustment mitigating the effects 
of VAT increases, triggered either by revenue needs or solely by the ongoing tax 
harmonization. 
3.2 DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We take a very simple approach to our analysis. First, using data from 2011 house­
hold budget survey, compiled by the Central Statistical Office of Poland (Główny 
Urząd Statystyczny – GUS), we estimate the VAT burdens for households at differ­
ent income levels. 





Tvd  denotes monthly amount of VAT paid by households from a given decile 
group (d),
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126 d represents decile group from 1 to 10.
Then VAT burden (Bi) is measured against annual gross income (GI):
  
(2)
The data set we obtained presents monthly consumption expenditure compiled 
from 37,584 representative households on a quarterly rotation basis. The survey 
excludes spending on purchases of residential property14, formally treated as in­
vestment spending.  
The detailed information on consumption spending allows us to assign a VAT rate 
applicable to a given expenditure item and calculate the amount of tax. In cases 
where it was not readily apparent what rate (or exemption) should be used we 
made necessary assumptions and apportionment. For example, data on bread con­
sumption does not allow for immediate distinction between fresh bread, defined as 
bread to be consumed within 14 days and taxed at five percent, and non­perishable 
bread with an expiration date longer than 14 days, taxed at eight percent. An im­
portant caveat has to be made here. Since the household budget survey does not 
allow us to establish from where all the goods and services were procured we as­
sume that all non­exempt items are taxable. This does not necessarily have to be 
true, as part of the spending, especially on grocery, takes place at small establish­
ments and greenmarkets, not to mention informal businesses, and as such is ex­
empt. For the lack of data we did not make an attempt to correct those values and 
acknowledge that such an approach may overstate the actual VAT burden for the 
poorer households, as they are more likely to buy from non­taxed suppliers. In 
cases where consumption items are exempt from VAT, e.g. healthcare services, we 
assume that VAT paid on inputs is passed through to consumers in the final price 
of the exempt good or service. To derive the amount of VAT, for simplicity, we 
assume that taxable inputs constitute 40 percent of the final price and they all 
carry VAT at the standard rate.15 Taking these assumptions into account the amount 




βd denotes the share of total consumption (Cd) subject to the standard VAT rate 
(sr), reduced VAT rate (rr), super reduced VAT rate (srr) or exempt from VAT (e),
r denotes the applicable VAT rate – standard (sr), reduced (rr), or super re­
duced (srr).
14 Although this category includes spending on newly built houses and apartments, which are subject to VAT 
in Poland, it does not critically impact our analysis for the 2011 VAT reform as it entailed changes in taxation 
of food products and a few merit goods. Nevertheless, on an aggregate level, it understates the VAT burden 
falling mostly on the rich and not the poor who usually self­build.  
15 The rigorous approach would dictate to use supply­use (or input­output) tables to approximate for the value 
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7For measurement of the VAT burden against annual income we choose to rely on 
gross rather than net income. Gross income is the most sterile benchmark availa­
ble and allows for comparisons of burdens generated by different taxes. Such an 
approach is motivated by a belief that taxes are interchangeable and this is the 
overall tax burden that matters for taxpayers.16 Reliance on disposable income, 
already adjusted for income tax payments, blurs and – in general – inflates the 
actual incidence of VAT. 
Since incomes reported in the household budget survey for each decile are net 
amounts (NI), we calculate the gross (pre­tax) income (GI) that it would be neces­
sary to earn, the difference being the amount of tax paid (Ti).
  (4)
Two important qualifications apply. First, all income received by a household is 
labor income taxed at progressive rates (18 and 32 percent) with a basic tax allow­
ance. Second, social security and health contributions are treated as taxes and 
form part of a tax wedge. This approach is not different from OECD Taxing Wages 
(OECD, 2013a) methodology and the European Commission and Eurostat’s Taxa-
tion Trends publications (EU, 2013). This implies:
  (5)
where:
SSCd denotes the amount of social security contributions, 
HCd denotes the amount of health contributions,








rssc denotes the rate of social security contributions,
rhc denotes the rate of health contribution, 
rit denotes the applicable rate of income tax, 
A is the amount of personal basic tax allowance,
γ denotes the share of health contribution allowed for deduction against in­
come tax,
CTC is the amount of child tax credit.
16 Naturally, the two general taxes – PIT and VAT – are not the only taxes falling on households. There are 
other, including property taxes and excise taxes, but these are ignored. The analysis of the progressivity is 
also limited to the tax system only and all government transfers aimed at helping the poor, e.g. family bene­
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128 Equation (4) may be transformed as follows:
  
(9)
To derive the amount of gross income and tax paid we use a simple Excel­based 
micro simulation technique, similar to that employed by the OECD for estimates 
of the tax burden in Taxing Wages (OECD, 2013b). In calculation of income tax 
we made the following assumptions. Each wage earner has only one job and lives 
and works in the same city. Each works throughout the whole year and has no sick 
or maternity/paternity absence, nor does he or she benefit from any other social 
support. If there are children in a household the earning parent(s) live with them 
and have the right to benefit from the child tax credit. A lone­parent allowance, but 
not family cash allowance7, is included in the calculation where applicable. If 
there are two working adults in a household they are deemed a married couple and 
are taxed jointly. Unless specifically indicated, no tax allowances and further de­
ductions are used. All income is earned in Poland and does not escape taxation.
Both data on expenditure and income are reported for one person. To arrive at 
household income and expenditure we use the modified OECD equivalent scale, 
which attributes a weight of 1 to the first household member, 0.5 to the remaining 
members over 14 years old and 0.3 to each child (below 14 years old).
Calculations for VAT and PIT tax burden are performed for a number of different 
households: (1) single adult household, (2) a married couple with two children, (3) 
a married couple with one child, and (4) a single parent household – one adult and 
one child. It is assumed that all the adults work and children do not.
To evaluate the distributional impact of the reform we compare two rate structures 
– the actual and a potential one, i.e. one the government could have chosen in the 
absence of equity concerns. The actual structure, as implemented in 2011, oper­
ates a standard rate of 23 percent, reduced rate of 8 percent and super reduced rate 
of 5 percent, applicable to food products and a few merit goods (actual scenario). 
The potential rate structure operates only two rates – 23 percent and the reduced 8 
percent, implying that the government chooses not to “improve” VAT incidence 
(base scenario). VAT­exempt consumption is kept constant in our calculations. 
We use the same consumption dataset for both scenarios. Our analysis is therefore 
static and it does not take into account any behavioral response to changes in the 
level of taxation. Also, a full pass­through of VAT burden in consumer prices is 
assumed.
7 Family cash allowance is a social subsidy available to families with children, having very low income per 
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1293.3 FINDINGSThe 0 VAT rate structure adjustment only slightly improved the progressivity 
of VAT – measured against both life­time and annual income. It did so at a very 
high cost to the budget. While providing only minimal relief to the poor it greatly 
subsidized the richer households.
In the base scenario, i.e. without lowering the tax rate on food, the average VAT 
rate amounts to 17.8 percent. Lower taxation of food brought this rate down to 
17.2 percent and benefited mostly the poor – the lowest income decile gained 0.84 
and the highest 0.38 percentage points. In this sense the reform was progressive. 
However, the reform did not significantly change the overall VAT incidence meas­
ured against annual consumption (as a proxy for lifetime income). As we show in 
figure 2 the actual reform only slightly tipped the balance of VAT burden towards 
the richer households – the ninth income decile paid 1 percentage point more in 
VAT than the first one. In the base scenario this difference would be only 0.6 per­
centage point.18  
Figure 2 
VAT distribution measured against consumption (%)
Source: 2011 Household Budget Survey, GUS, Authors’ calculations.
Annual income incidence analysis renders similar results. In line with expecta­
tions our calculations confirm that the Polish VAT is regressive and the 2011 re­
form only slightly improved its income redistribution. The adoption of a 5 percent 
rate brought the VAT burden down by 1.2 percentage points for the first income 
decile and by 0.2 percentage points for the highest. Although the balance tips to 
the poorest the VAT remained a regressive tax. In figure 3 we show the shift in the 
overall burden of VAT measured against gross income. We do not plot results for 
18 Interdecile comparisons between first and last income decile may blur the results due to the pronounced 
impact of exemptions. The highest income decile consumes disproportionally more exempt services (i.e. health, 
recreation, culture), thus benefiting more than the poorer households. Bearing in mind that our analysis regards 
reduced rates we do not consider any changes in exemptions and keep it constant in our calculations.     
Base scenario Actual scenario
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130 the first income decile for presentational purposes only. We will include it in fur­
ther analysis and discussion. 
Figure 3 
VAT distribution measured against gross income (%)*
* Gross income of a household composed of two working adults and two children below 14 
years old.
Source: 2011 Household Budget Survey, GUS, authors’ calculations.
As argued earlier, VAT is just another tax paid by households, and should be ana­
lyzed together with their income tax payments. Our calculations show that distri­
bution of the overall tax wedge, i.e. ratio of tax payments and gross income, to a 
large extent hinges on the income tax burden. This implies that in an annual per­
spective VAT regressivity is counterbalanced by income taxes, especially for the 
richer part of society (last five income deciles). Since the income tax provides for 
a number of family­related tax preferences – joint taxation of spouses, joint taxa­
tion of single parents and their not working children (lone­parent allowance) and 
child tax credits – the degree to which the VAT burden is corrected by income 
taxation depends on household composition. In figure 4 we present income tax 
and VAT distribution for four classes of households: a single adult, single parent 
with a child, a married couple with two children, and a married couple with one 
child. In addition, as previously, we plot in the effect of 2011 VAT reform as a 
hypothetical addition to the actual tax burden. 
As can be seen in figure 4, VAT disproportionally burdens households in the first 
income decile, regardless of their composition. These results are not surprising, 
given that the consumption, as reported in the household budget survey, exceeds 
almost twice the income of households in the first decile. There are two important 
remarks to make. First, as noted in the literature (e.g. Arsic and Altiparmakov, 
2013), data for this group is often subject to measurement errors, implying that 
actual income may be higher. Second, as we already noted, a significant portion of 
Base scenario Actual VAT
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consumption spending by the poorest households is not subject to VAT, implying 
that their actual VAT payments may be lower than our calculations indicate. 
Figure 4 
Overall tax wedge faced by different classes of households (%)
Source: 2011 Household Budget Survey, GUS, authors’ calculations.
Finally, bearing in mind that the objective of this paper is to evaluate the 2011 
VAT reform, we should note that regardless of the class of household the gain 
from 5 percent VAT rate did not significantly alter the overall tax burden house­
holds face. A small adjustment to the income tax structure could yield better re­
sults in terms of tax distribution than lowering VAT on food consumption.
Whatever the addition to VAT progressivity through lower VAT rates it is clear 
from our analysis that they benefit households across all income levels. The 2011 
reform aggravated this. In absolute terms (dollar value) most benefits of the re­
form accrued to the rich households. On average the lowest income decile saved 
in VAT payments PLN 47.24 (USD 15.96) per annum, whereas the highest income 
decile gained more than twice this amount – PLN 101.23 (USD 34.20). We show 
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132 Figure 5 
Gains from 2011 VAT Reform (left axis in USD, right axis in percent)
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Source: 2011 Household budget survey, GUS, authors’ calculations.
The cost of the reform, what we estimate to be at around PLN 2.6 billion (USD 0.9 
billion) or 0.2 percent of GDP, brought down the VAT revenue by 3.2 percent, as 
compared with the base scenario. Most of the revenue the government decided to 
forego to help the poor accrued to higher income households. The poorer part of 
the society (first three income deciles) benefited by 22 percent and the richer (last 
three income deciles) by 39 percent of the total revenue foregone. Bearing in mind 
that those poorer households procure their food products from non­taxed suppliers 
(greenmarkets, small traders or informal businesses) more often than the richer 
ones, their benefits from the reform are even smaller than indicated by our calcula­
tions.
The consumption patterns provide valuable insights into VAT’s inability to ad­
dress distributional equity concerns. In Poland they do not deviate from the pre­
dictions of economic theory. Total consumption of households increases as their 
disposable income rises. In line with this the basket of goods and services pro­
cured changes – the share of spending on food and other essentials (e.g. energy, 
cold water) declines and expenditure on durable goods, e.g. means of transport 
and various services, including tourism, recreation, restaurants, culture, educa­
tion, rises. In figure 6 we show changes in consumption of chosen classes of goods 
and services. 
In absolute terms, with only a few exceptions, food spending increases. It merely 
represents a lower share of their incomes and total consumption basket. The low­
est income decile spent PLN 171.22 (USD 57.85) monthly for food and non­alco­
holic drinks, which represented 36.4 percent of total consumption, whereas the 
highest decile spent more than twice this amount – PLN 371.65 (USD 125.56) 
accounting for only 16.7 percent of total spending. The interdecile ratio of abso­
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tion may be observed, amongst other, for fish, tropical fruit, fruit juices, mineral 
water, chocolate and butter. Spending on bread, milk and certain vegetables is 
fairly constant and there are only a few items where it declined, potatoes and 
sugar being the most prominent ones. This dooms any efforts to improve progres­
sivity of taxation through reduced VAT rates to ineffectiveness, at least it terms of 
revenue.
Figure 6 
Share of consumption for selected classes of goods and services (%)
Source: 2011 Household Budget Survey, GUS, authors’ calculations. 
4 CONCLUSIONS
Polish society is not egalitarian but income inequality is smaller than in many 
other OECD countries. With an after tax Gini coefficient at 0.3 in 2010 equity is­
sues, as it seems, should not be a major concern. Yet Poland in 2011, while in­
creasing VAT by 1 percentage point, as part of its fiscal consolidation effort, de­
cided to lower its rate on food and a few merit goods – from 8 to 5 percent – to 
ease the tax burden for the poor. No other mitigating measures, either through in­
come tax or on the spending side, were adopted. 
We find that the 2011 VAT reform only slightly improved the distribution of VAT 
and the overall progressivity of the tax system. It did so at a very high cost to the 
budget. While providing only minimal relief to the poor it greatly subsidized richer 
households. The three last income deciles gained as much as 39 percent of the total 
benefits of the reform which – in terms of revenue forgone – we estimated at PLN 
2.6 billion (USD 0.9 billion) or 0.2 percent of GDP. The three first income deciles 
benefited only 22 percent of this amount with all the likelihood for this number to 
be even lower as poorer households more often than richer buy from non­taxed 
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134 The attempt to alleviate the plight of the poor does not seem to have been neces­
sary. Measured against consumption, as a proxy for lifetime income, VAT would 
be anyway mildly progressive and the reform hardly changed that. When its an­
nual incidence is considered – an approach favored by policymakers – VAT with­
out further rate reduction on food would have imposed a higher burden on the 
poorer part of the society. Again, the rate adjustment did not change this regressive 
property of the VAT. A closer look at the combined income and VAT tax burden 
faced by households reveals that the regressive nature of VAT to a large extent is 
counterbalanced by progressive income tax. With a small change to the income 
tax structure the government could have secured more progressivity at a lower 
cost in terms of revenue foregone. 
The Polish experience with VAT rate structure adjustment confirms that any ef­
forts to pursue progressivity through reduced rates are doomed to be ineffective. 
There are several reasons for this, but consumption patterns are the underlying 
one, especially in the case of food. In line with economic theory, spending on food 
declines as income increases. It declines as a share of income but not in absolute 
terms. In such a setting the richer by definition benefit more, at a high cost of rev­
enue forgone and loss of efficiency. There are only a few inferior food products 
whose consumption declines as income rises. The Polish household budget survey 
reveals only two – the potato and sugar.
Although consumption patterns differ with income, consumption per se does not 
constitute a good basis for addressing distributional concerns. This renders VAT 
the tax least suited for the pursuit of distributional equity objectives for they inher­
ently relate to the income and personal characteristic of taxpayers. Reliance on a 
broad­based and single­rated VAT for revenue generation and use of progressive 
income taxes may yield far better results. As noted in Keen (2003a) “even poorly 
targeted [government] spending may be a better way to support the poor than a 
reduced rate.” Helping the poor by subsidizing the rich is one of the most impru­
dent and deceitful policies and one that no society can ever afford. Pursuing dis­
tributional equity through the differentiation of VAT rates is one such policy and 
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